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The Internet is a loose amalgamation of independent service providers acting in their own self-
interest. We examine the implications of this economic reality on peering relationships. Specifically,
we consider how the incentives of the providers might determine where they choose to interconnect
with each other. We consider a game where two selfish network providers must establish peering
points between their respective network graphs, given knowledge of traffic conditions and a nearest-
exit routing policy for out-going traffic, as well as costs based on congestion and peering connectivity.
We focus on the pairwise stability equilibrium concept and use a stochastic procedure to solve for
the stochastically pairwise stable configurations. Stochastically stable networks are selected for
their robustness to deviations in strategy and are therefore posited as the more likely networks
to emerge in a dynamic setting. We note a paucity of stochastically stable peering configurations
under asymmetric conditions, particularly to unequal interdomain traffic flow, with adverse effects
on system-wide efficiency. Under bilateral flow conditions, we find that as the cost associated with
the establishment of peering links approaches zero, the variance in the number of peering links of
stochastically pairwise stable equilibria increases dramatically.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Much of the attention that has been paid to routing in
data networks is predicated on the assumption that the
network is owned by a single operator. In this scenario,
the operator attempts to achieve some system-wide per-
formance objective like minimizing latency or minimizing
telecommunication costs. Such analyses still dominate,
and yet a growing number of network domains, like the
Internet, consist of a loose federation of autonomous, self-
interested components, or network providers. In such a
world, the objectives of each individual provider remain
the same but are no longer necessarily consistent with
any global performance measure. The self-interested be-
havior of the parties involved means that the efficiency
of the whole network does not rely on an engineering so-
lution per se, but is inextricably tied to the economic
realities of its implementation.
To understand the economic incentives endemic to the
problem of interconnecting networks, we must first char-
acterize the nature of these interconnections. Most rela-
tionships between two network providers can be classified
into one of two types: transit and peer [1]. Provider A
provides transit to provider B if B pays A to carry traf-
fic originating within B and destined elsewhere in the
Internet (either inside or outside A’s network). In such
an agreement, provider A accepts the responsibility of
carrying any traffic entering from B across their inter-
connection link.
In this paper, we are are primarly concerned with
peering relationships. Such interconnections consist in
∗Electronic address: jacomo@eecs.harvard.edu
one or more bidirectional links established between two
providers A and B. Unlike transit service, in a peering
relationship providers A and B will only accept traffic
that is destined for points within their respective do-
mains, and there is no service level agreement or mone-
tary transfer between the two parties. This latter feature
means that peering decreases the reliance and therefore
the cost of purchased transit - which is the single greatest
operating expense for Internet Service Providers (ISPs)
[1]. Peering also lowers inter-Autonomous System (AS)
traffic latency by reducing congestion at transit points,
particularly National Access Points (NAPs) [2].
But while peering has been a mainstay of Internet in-
dustry growth, for the past several years, many ISPs have
broken peering agreements because of asymmetric traffic
patterns and asymmetric benefits and costs from peer-
ing. The reason for this stems from a ’tragedy of the
commons’ scenario that arises when providers share a
common backbone connection and pay no penalties for
overuse. A number of authors have made this point in
a variety of contexts [1, 2]. Such problems can be cir-
cumvented under transit arrangements, however the pro-
hibitive cost of monitoring Internet traffic makes such
agreements impractical - as illustrated by the relative
paucity of transit relationships between large backbones.
Moreover, the benefits of peering, both among backbone
(otherwise known as “tier 1”) providers and between
smaller ISPs, in reducing traffic latency telecommunica-
tion costs are well documented. For further details, see
[2, 3].
To understand the impact of peering relationships on
network efficiency, we now qualify their effects on network
providers. When two providers form a link connecting
their networks (hereafter referred to as a peering link),
the traffic flowing across that link incurs a cost on the
network it enters. Such a cost may be felt at the time of
2network provisioning (i.e. in order to meet the quantity
of traffic through a peering link, a provider may have to
increase its network capacity) or, alternatively, as an on-
going network management cost associated with coping
with the increased congestion from additional traffic. We
avoid making any specific assumptions about the nature
of the network costs in our model, simply noting that
these two interpretations are possible.
One impetus for network providers’ interconnection
agreements is the value gained by end users through that
interconnection. Therefore, a complete characterization
of the economic incentives underlying interconnections
must include such benefits in addition to network costs.
That said, in this paper we work with a model introduced
by Johari and Tsitsiklis [4] where two providers have al-
ready agreed to peer together. In doing so, we assume
that the value to the end users is implicitly captured by
this agreement. Our model only considers the network
costs associated with peering relationships.
Consider a situation, then, where providers A and B
are peers. Both providers have a certain volume of traf-
fic to send to each other and want to minimize their
costs. As mentioned earlier, because peering does not
include any service level agreement or monetary trans-
fer, a tragedy of the commons scenario emerges whereby
each provider has a clear incentive to force traffic into the
other’s network as quickly and cheaply as possible. This
phenomenon is known as “nearest exit” or “hot potato”
routing and is the de facto standard for outgoing traffic
routing between peers. Nearest exit routing’s prevalence
lies above all in the policy’s simplicity - only local knowl-
edge is assumed - and its enforceability.
In this paper, we consider a problem that stems from
the phenomenon of nearest exit routing in interdomain
peering. Given the distribution of traffic between the two
networks, both providers assume that the other will use
a nearest exit routing policy. The question then becomes
the following: Where (in their respective networks) will
A and B like to establish peering links? The decision of
where to place their peering links is tied to the providers’
concern with minimizing network costs (whether provi-
sioning or congestion), which in turn is a function of the
providers’ network graphs and the traffic distribution be-
tween them. Clearly, given the assumption of nearest
exit routing, the optimal placement for A will not cor-
respond to that for B. We address the question of how
the differing preferences of the providers translate into a
bilaterally negociated placement of peering links. We are
interested in understanding and characterizing the net-
works that result when network providers choose their
peering connections in this way, as well as how the effi-
cacy of these negotiated outcomes varies with cost and
traffic flow parameters in the system.
Johari and Tsitsiklis [4] recently studied the peering
point placement problem between two providers under
the restriction of unilateral interdomain traffic flow, that
is a special case of our model. They furthermore inves-
tigate the problem of optimally placing N peering links,
and show that in the general case the optimal placement
strategies for the sender and receiver providers are not
the same. This result motivates our formulation of the
problem as a game, where the number and location of
peering links is endogenous to the model.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 formulates
the peering point placement problem as a game theoretic
model, also introducing the notions of pairwise stable
and stochastically pairwise stable equilibria, as well as
how the latter can be obtained via a stochastic process.
In section 3, we describe the main findings regarding the
artificial dynamics implied by our model and the distri-
butions of the pairwise stable equilibria. We also mention
preliminary results from ongoing work. Finally, conclu-
sions are drawn in section 4.
II. THE PEERING POINT PLACEMENT GAME
In this section, we provide a description of the peering
point placement game we use to investigate the peer-
connected networks that result when two providers have
already agreed to establish a peering relationship. The
network providers A and B consist of separate network
graphs. We make the assumption that A and B (both
of size N nodes) share the same network topology. This
strong assumption is justified on the grounds that peering
relations exist between similar-sized networks, e.g. be-
tween backbone providers or between small ISPs; there-
fore we might expect some similarity in their topologies.
It is important to note that our results do not hinge on
this assumption: the paucity of peering equilibria we ob-
serve in asymmmetric traffic conditions naturally lends
itself to an interpretation of asymmetrically sized net-
works. Mainly, we share this assumption with a similar
model presented in [4] in order to provide a point of com-
parison for our results, which is part of ongoing work.
We assume that both network providers send some
amount of traffic to each other and that both are us-
ing nearest exit routing. To provide a general account of
traffic distribution conditions, we fix the amount of traffic
sent from A to B to be 1 packet from every node in A to
every node in B, i.e. every node in B receives N packets
from A. In the other direction, we state that the amount
of traffic sent from B to A is β ∈ [0, 1] packets from every
node in B to every node in A. The traffic distribution is
therefore specified exogenously to the game itself. How-
ever, note that as we increase β, we move away from the
completely unilateral situation where A is the sole sender
of traffic, to the equally bilateral situation where A and
B send each other an equal volume of traffic.
Given these known traffic demands, network providers
A and B play a game to connect their two graphs so that
traffic can be routed between them by establishing some
set of links P ⊆ E, where E is the set of all possible
links between A and B: E = {(i, j) : i ∈ A, j ∈ B}. sXij
∈ {0, 1} denotes the intention of a provider X ∈ {A,B}
to establish a peering link between node i ∈ X in its
3own graph and node j in the other’s graph. Given
the strategies of both providers, given by the vector
s = (sAij , s
B
ji, i ∈ A, j ∈ B), a peer-connected network
g(s) = (A ∪B, {EA ∪ EB ∪ P (s)}) is formed, where
P (s) =
{
(i, j) : sAij ∩ s
B
ji, i ∈ A, j ∈ B
}
(1)
where EA and EB denote the edges in the a priori defined
graphs of A and B, respectively. In words, a peering link
is established between nodes i in A and j in B if and
only if it is desired by both providers, i.e. if and only if
sAij = s
B
ji = 1. The graph g(s) then represents the entire
peer-connected network. For notational convenience, we
sometimes refer to g(s) simply as g and P (s) as P .
Given a set of peering links P , we assume
that the routing of packets results in a vector(
fXi (P ), i ∈ X,X ∈ {A,B}
)
, where fXi (P ) is the amount
of flow passing through or terminating at node i in graph
X . This can be construed as the level of congestion at
the node i. We assume that X incurs a cost α ∈ [0, 1] for
each unit of traffic which either passes or terminates at
a node i, and a cost (1 − α) for every peering link in P .
Therefore, given g(s), the total cost to network provider
X is
CX(P (s)) =
α
nf
·
∑
i∈X
fXi (P (s)) +
(1− α)
np
|P (s)| (2)
where np and nf are normalization factors: np ≥ 1 is
an upperbound on the maximum number of links; nf is
the worst-case congestion for the network A or B [15].
The calculation of nf hinges on our specification of f
X
i ,
which in turn depends on certain flow conservation con-
ditions. We avoid discussing these flow conservation con-
ditions here, instead referring the interested reader to a
discussion of monotonicity and flow feasibility conditions
in [5]. We simply point out that under our flow assump-
tions, congestion is always diminished by the addition
of peering links and therefore maximized for some single
peering link. In our simulations, we conduct an exhaus-
tive search to find this single worst-case connection. We
also let np = N , noting that in equilibrium the num-
ber of outgoing links from a graph will never exceed N .
Finally, because we are modelling a situation where two
providers have already agreed to peer, we assure connect-
edness between A and B by imposing a very large penalty
for disconnection.
A. Pairwise stable equilibria
For the following discussion, recall that E is the set of
all possible links. For P ⊆ E, let sP denote the values of
the strategy vector s restricted to the set of peering links
P ; that is,
sP =
(
sAij , s
B
ji, (i, j) ∈ P
)
. (3)
By an abuse of notation, we denote s(i,j) = s{(i,j)} =
(sAij , s
B
ji). Therefore s =
(
s(i,j), sE\{(i,j)}
)
. The following
definition describes the equilibrium concept to be studied
thoughout the paper.
Definition 1 A strategy vector s is pairwise stable if for
every possible (i, j) ∈ E, the following conditions hold:
(1) For any s′(i,j) =
(
(s′)Aij , s
B
ji
)
:
CA
(
s′(i,j), sE\{(i,j)}
)
≥ CA(s). (4)
(2) For any s′(i,j) =
(
sAij , (s
′)Bji
)
:
CB
(
s′(i,j), sE\{(i,j)}
)
≥ CB(s). (5)
(3)For any s′(i,j) =
(
(s′)Aij , (s
′)Bji
)
, at least one of the
following holds:
CA
(
s′(i,j), sE\{(i,j)}
)
≥ CA(s); (6)
CB
(
s′(i,j), sE\{(i,j)}
)
≥ CB(s); (7)
We will also refer to the network g(s) generated by such a
stategy vector s as a pairwise stable network or a pairwise
stable equilibrium.
The notion of pairwise stability, introduced by Jackson
and Wolinsky [6], is meant to capture, in a static game
setting, the dynamic process of bargaining and negoti-
ation which leads to the establishment of peering links.
Therefore, a link only remains in the graph if it is mu-
tually profitable for both link-constituting agents, while
either party can decide against any given link; i.e., link
severance is unilateral while link creation is bilateral.
More formally, in checking whether a strategy vector s is
pairwise stable, Condition 3 of Definition 1 need not be
checked for (i, j) ∈ P (s).
Lemma 2 Given a strategy vector s, suppose that:
(1) Conditions 1 and 2 of Definition 1 hold for (i, j) ∈
E; and
(2) If Condition 3 of Definition 1 holds for (i, j) /∈
P (s), then s is pairwise stable.
Moreover, while pairwise stability is a weak stability no-
tion, it is also appealing because of its ability to generate
sharp predictions about the tension between stability and
efficiency in many contexts [7].
More generally, we might allow an agent to sever a
subset of linksQ ⊆ P , since this is a unilateral action. We
make an important note about pairwise stable equilibria
in our game in this regard. We define a strong pairwise
stable equilibrium as a strategy vector s, or equivalently
a network g(s), which is stable to the addition of single
links, as in Condition 3 of Definition 1, and the deletion
of any subset Q ⊆ P of links [8]. Ergo, the first two
individual rationality conditions of Defintion 1 have been
strengthened.
4Lemma 3 A strategy vector s is pairwise stable if and
only if it is strongly pairwise stable.
This correspondence follows from the flow conserva-
tion (monotonicty and flow feasibility) conditions in our
model. Again, for a discussion of these conditions, we re-
fer the reader to [5]. Therefore, while we keep referring to
pairwise stable equilibria, one should remember that such
equilibria are predicated on strong individually rational
conditions in our game. Still more generally, we might al-
low for simultaneous addition of links. This would lead to
a notion of stability accouting for coalitional deviations,
which is beyond the scope of this work.
Johari and Tsitsiklis [4] show that finding the optimal
placement of peering links for either provider in a peer-
ing placement problem similar to the one we have defined
is NP-complete [16]. In fact, solving for pairwise stable
networks suffers from the same problem of combinato-
rial explosion and is also NP-complete (see [9] p. 206).
NP-completeness suggests that all known algorithms to
solve the problem require time which is exponential in
the problem size (for instance, in the size of the network
providers’ graphs). We cope with the intractability of our
problem by restricting our attention to the set of stochas-
tically stable networks, i.e. to the set of stochastically
pairwise stable equilibria.
B. Stochastically pairwise stable equilibria
Given the intractability of providing a full charac-
terization of pairwise stable networks, we instead use
a stochastic procedure to solve for a distribution of
stochastically pairwise stable networks. Our algorithm
is adapted from a dynamic process of network formation
proposed by Jackson and Watts [7].
Consider the following process: At each period,
providersA and B consider either the addition or deletion
of a single link, with equal probability. If the providers
consider the addition of a link, then some (i, j) ∈ E is
chosen at random and both providers independently de-
cide whether the addition of the link would be beneficial.
The link is added if it meets the approval of both play-
ers. This corresponds to Condition 3 of Definition 1. If
the providers consider the severance of a link, then some
link (i, j) ∈ P is randomly chosen and both providers
independently and unilaterally decide whether the link
in question should remain, corresponding to Conditions
1 and 2 of Definition 1.
This procedure provides a mechanism whereby agents
iteratively approach a pairwise stable network, either ter-
minating at such a network or in a fixed cycle [7].
Now consider, a perturbed version of the above
stochastic process where the providers’ correct decisions
in creating, maintaining, and deleting links are inverted
with probability ε ∈ (0, a]. These incorrect appraisals
may be understood as mistakes or mutations [10]. The
characterization of the asymptotic behaviour of this pro-
cess is due to Young [11] and Freidlin and Wentzell [12].
Briefly, for small but non-zero values of ε, the per-
turbed stochastic process denotes the traversal of an ir-
reducible and aperiodic Markov chain. Therefore, it has
a unique limiting stationary distribution, i.e. the process
is ergodic. As ε goes to zero, the stationary distribution
converges to a unique limiting stationary distribution.
The networks which are in support of that distribution
are said to be stochastically stable.
This process selects for networks with higher resis-
tances, i.e. those with larger basins of attraction. For
2 × 2 games, the stochastically stable states correspond
to the risk-dominant equilibria [13]. Stochastically stable
networks can therefore be construed as the pairwise sta-
ble networks that are more likely to emerge in a dynamic
process of network formation. Furthermore, the above
procedure provides an effective way to characterize this
set of networks via simulation.
That said, we would like to make a cautionary note in
this regard. The rate of degeneration for ε must be less
than the slowest rate of convergence to equilibrium for
the unperturbed process [10], which makes large state
spaces difficult to search. The size of the state space
in our game is upperbounded by 2|E| where |E| = |A|2,
given A and B are topologically the same. Even so, simu-
lations on graphs with as many as 100 nodes indicate that
the qualitative relations between parameters observed on
smaller graphs remain the same, suggesting the efficacy
of the algorithm on larger graphs (as well as the invari-
ance of our results to topological peculiarities).
We numerically simulate the unique limiting station-
ary distribution of the perturbed dynamic process by the
following simple rule:
εt =
{
0.5 for t < 10000,
0.5 · e0.0001(10000−t) otherwise.
(8)
FIG. 1: Time evolution of the number of peering links for
the unilateral case with cost parameter α = 1. After a cer-
tain equilibration period enforced by our stochastic algorithm,
|P | = 1 is reached.
5III. RESULTS
In this section we present some simulation results pro-
viding a partial characterization of stochastically stable
peering configurations when A and B are scale-free net-
works with 100 nodes constructed according to the model
based on growth and preferential attachment [14]. It is
well known that the topology of large ASes is closely
scale-free.
A. The unilateral case
Fig. 1 shows the time evolution of the number of peer-
ing links for the case where α = 1 and β = 0 (unilateral
flow). The fact that quite many peering links are es-
tablished for t . 3000 is due to the perturbed dynamic
process. As far as the equilibrium state is concerned, we
found |P |eq = 1 for α < 1 and in the case α = 1, there
was a 2% chance of ending up with 2 final peering links.
When it comes to the costs, the receiver has to pay an
amount of 0.3565 units independently of where the link
is established. This has to do with the fixed topology
and with the fact that the receiver (B) sends no packets
in the present case. Concerning the sender, on the other
hand, certain nodes are preferable to others in that the
incurred traffic costs is lower. Fig. 2 shows the sender’s
cost distribution in the stationary state.
FIG. 2: Distribution of the sender’s cost in the steady state
(for unilateral flow). This result was obtained by statistically
analyzing the costs of graph A for times 10000 < t < 100000
for 150 different runs.
B. Bilateral flow
A more interesting situation arises when both ISPs A
and B send data packets. We investigated the case where
FIG. 3: The average number of established peering links as
a function of α for the bilateral case. For α ≤ 0.2 only one
link remained in equilibrium, hence the lack of the error bar.
Up to α ≤ 0.9 the distributions were well peaked around
the corresponding mean values whereas the present average
values were scattered much more broadly for α = 1 (note
the logarithmic scale). These results were obtained for times
10000 < t < 100000 and for 150 different runs.
each node in graph X sends one packet to every node in
graph Y , X,Y ∈ {A,B}, i.e. β = 1. Fig. 3 shows the
average number of peering links that were established in
equilibrium. For α ≤ 0.9, these values are meaningful
quantities as the accompanying variances appear to be
small. Note also the exponential growth in the range
0.5 ≤ α ≤ 0.9. In the case where the peering links no
longer contribute to the cost (α = 1), the peering struc-
ture is subject to much stronger fluctuations. In other
words, there seems to be some type of phase transition
for α→ 1−.
Fig. 4 illustrates the mean values of the costs as α is
varied. The fact that CA behaves very similarly to CB is
a reflection of β = 1. A rather linear relationship between
C and α can furthermore be observed for α . 0.8.
C. Ongoing work
We are currently analyzing the equilibria of our game
on smaller and more regular, i.e. more tractable, topolo-
gies. Initial findings suggest that many efficient peering
configurations are pairwise stable over small ranges of
α but only stable for a very precise β. Moreover, we
note that the set of pairwise stable configurations con-
tain closely efficient graphs for a broad range of α, β
pairs. Furthermore, for β = 1 the system exhibits a wide
range of stochastically pairwise stable peering configura-
tions for intermediate values of α. However, for β < 1,
there is a drastic paucity of stochastically stable equilib-
ria and the more efficient peering configurations are no
6FIG. 4: A and B’s costs (their averages) as a function of α
for β = 1. Note that the costs end up in well defined ranges,
and the linear growth with α can be observed as well. For
simulational details, see Fig. 3.
longer stable. This suggests that peering is sensitive to
asymmetries, particularly in perceived traffic load distri-
butions. This also means that peering relations are more
sensitive to differences in traffic loads than to differences
in network size–the latter representing a variation in α
as opposed to β. Of mention is that these results are
irrespective of network topology. We are currently work-
ing toward a full characterization of stable and efficient
configurations in our game.
IV. CONCLUSIONS
We study how economic incentives affect the peering
relationship between two network providers. Specifically,
we consider a game where two selfish network providers
must establish peering points between their respective
network graphs, given knowledge of traffic conditions and
a nearest-exit routing policy for out-going traffic, as well
as costs based on congestion and peering connectivity
involving a parameter α which gives their relative im-
portance. We focus on the pairwise stability equilibrium
concept and use a stochastic procedure to solve for the
stochastically pairwise stable configurations.
We note a paucity of stochastically stable peering con-
figurations under asymmetric conditions, particularly to
unequal interdomain traffic flow, with adverse effects on
system-wide efficiency. The volatility of peering relation-
ships in the face of perceived asymetries suggests that
peering will become increasingly rare as traffic and cost
monitoring become more accurate and available.
For the case of equally bilateral traffic flow, we find a
transition in behavior for α → 1−, meaning that below
this value, the number of peering links is well peaked
around some mean value and above it, strong fluctuations
are observed. We furthermore find that the costs of both
providers grow linearly with α.
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